Hofstra Law Review
Volume 12 | Issue 2

Article 6

1984

The Federal Rules of Evidence: A Few Surprises
David E. Seidelson

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Seidelson, David E. (1984) "The Federal Rules of Evidence: A Few Surprises," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 12: Iss. 2, Article 6.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol12/iss2/6

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Seidelson: The Federal Rules of Evidence: A Few Surprises

THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: A
FEW SURPRISES
David E. Seidelson*
I.

INTRODUCTION

It has been nearly a decade since the Federal Rules of Evidence
became effective.1 During this period, the Rules have been a boon to
judges, lawyers, and law school professors. In the courtroom, the
Rules have afforded an enhanced degree of predictability and certainty to evidentiary rulings. In the classroom, the Rules have become the focal point of many courses on Evidence and the source of
an overview of Evidence in virtually all of the courses. At the same
time, however, the Rules have generated several surprises-at least
to me. Some of those surprises have arisen out of what the Rules
provide, some out of what the Rules do not provide, and a few out of
what the courts have said the Rules provide. I would like to share
some of my sense of surprise with you.

II.

RULE

104

AND COCONSPIRATOR DECLARATIONS

Long before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
federal courts treated a coconspirator declaration as an exception to
the hearsay rule and admitted it as evidence, provided the government offered independent evidence that the defendant and the declarant had been coconspirators and that the declaration had been
made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.' Most
* Professor of Law, George Washington University.
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 101- 1103 (1976 & Supp. V. 1981). Congress spelled out the effective
date of the Rules as follows:
[T]he following rules shall take effect on the one hundred and eightieth day
beginning after the date of the enactment of this Act. These rules apply to actions,
cases, and proceedings brought after the rules take effect [on July 1, 1975]. These
rules also apply to further procedure in actions, cases, and proceedings then pending, except to the extent that application of the rules would not be feasible, or would
work injustice, in which event former evidentiary principles apply.
Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1926 ("An act to establish rules of
evidence for certain courts and proceedings"--the Federal Rules of Evidence).
2. If A and B are engaged in a conspiracy the acts and declarations of B occurring
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courts treated the admissible coconspirator declaration as conditionally relevant evidence.8 The condition precedent to relevancy was an
while the conspiracy is actually in progress and in furtherance of the design are
provable against A, because they are acts for which he is criminally or civilly responsible, as a matter of substantive law. But B's declarations may also be proved
against A as representative admissions, to prove the truth of the matter declared. . . . The courts have seldom discriminated between declarations offered as
conduct constituting part of the conspiracy and declarations offered as vicarious admission of the facts declared, and even when offered for the latter purpose, generally
have imposed the same test, namely that the declaration must have been made while
the conspiracy was continuing, and must have constituted a step in furtherance of
the venture.
C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 267, at 645 (2d ed. 1972) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK's EvIDENCE]; see United States v. Honneus,
508 F.2d 566, 576-77 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); United States v.
Lemon, 497 F.2d 854, 857 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Apollo, 476 F.2d 156, 163 (5th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1028 (1970).
3. See, e.g., United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,442
U.S. 917 (1979). The Fifth Circuit stated:
[Prior to the Federal Rules of Evidence,] the judge and the jury. . . share[d]
the responsibility for determining whether these conditions [were] met . . . . [W]e
held that the judge's role [was] to make a preliminary determination whether the
government ha[d] presented sufficient evidence, independent of the hearsay itself, to
support a finding by the jury that the alleged conspiracy existed and that the declarant and the defendant against whom the statement [was] offered were members of
that conspiracy. This is the "prima facie case" standard. . . . If the judge [was]
satisfied that this test ha[d] been met, then . . . the jury [was] instructed, both
when the hearsay [was] introduced and at the final charge, that it may consider the
hearsay against a particular defendant only if it first finds that the conspiracy existed, that the declarant and the defendant were members of it, and that the statement was made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Id. at 577-78 (citations omitted). In United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1977),
the court explained that:
In this circuit, the jury has had a prominent role in deciding whether the co-conspirator exception can be invoked. Trial courts instruct the jury that a co-conspirator's
hearsay may be used against a defendant only if the defendant's membership in the
conspiracy has been established by independent, nonhearsay evidence.
Id. at 22. In United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, (7th Cir. 1978), the court stated:
It has long been the general rule in this circuit that the defendant who failed to
prevent the admission into evidence of co-conspirator statements by convincing the
trial judge that a prima facie showing of the alleged conspiracy had not been established by the government by independent evidence was to be given a second chance
to make a similar exclusion argument to the jury. The jury was then instructed that
the acts and declarations of one of the alleged co-conspirators made during and in
the furtherance of the conspiracy could not be used against another alleged co-conspirator until it had been established by independent evidence. . . that a conspiracy
existed and that the other alleged co-conspirator was a member of that conspiracy.
Id. at 1131-32 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Honneus,
508 F.2d 566 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); United States v. Lemon, 497
F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1974).
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affirmative jury determination, based on the independent evidence,
that the defendant and the declarant had been coconspirators and
that the declaration had been uttered during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.' The jury was instructed that, if it made
such an affirmative factual finding, based on the independent evidence, it was to consider the coconspirator's declaration as evidence
in determining whether the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.5 On the other hand, the jury was instructed that, if, based
on the independent evidence, it did not make such an affirmative factual finding, it was to disregard the alleged coconspirator's declaration in deciding the guilt or innocence of the defendant.6
Under the Rules, of course, a coconspirator's declaration remains admissible over a hearsay objection; only the nomenclature
has changed. Rule 801(d)(2)(E) characterizes a coconspirator's declaration as nonhearsay rather than as an exception to the hearsay
rule.7 Surprisingly, however, the pre-existing jury function of determining the existence of the condition precedent to relevancy has
been usurped by the trial judge in every circuit to have considered
the issue.8 In light of the language of rules 104(a)9 and 104(b), 10 and
the Advisory Committee note to rule 104(b),11 the judicial conclusion reached by the courts was unexpected.
Rule 104(a) requires that "[p]reliminary questions concerning
4. See cases cited supra note 3.
5. Id.
6. See United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, 1131-32 (7th Cir. 1978); see also
cases cited supra note 3.
7. "A statement is not hearsay if. . . [t]he statement is offered against a party and is
a statement by a coconspirator of [the] party [made] during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." FED. R. EvID. 801 (d)(2)(E).
8. In United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
917 (1979), the Fifth Circuit noted: "In reaching this conclusion, [that a determination as to
the existence of the condition precedent to relevancy is to be made by the trial judge,] we...
find ourselves in accord with the courts of appeals of all the circuits which have addressed the
issue." Id. at 580. Accord United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1217-18 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d 149 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074, 445 U.S.
904 (1980); United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 603 F.2d 444 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980); United States v. Andrews, 585 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Stanchich, 550
F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1977); United
States v. Trotter, 529 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1976).
9. FED. R. EvID. 104(a).
10. FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
11. FED. R. EvID. 104(b) advisory committee note. For an examination of the pre-legislative history of rule 104(b), see Seidelson, ConditionalRelevancy and Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b), 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1048, 1048-53 & nn. 2-16 (1979).
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. . .admissibility of evidence" are to be decided by the trial judge,

"subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)." ' 2 Rule 104(b) determines the relevancy of evidence which is conditioned upon the existence of a finding of fact. The trial judge is required to admit the
evidence if there has been an introduction of evidence "sufficient to
support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.

13

The Advisory

Committee's note to rule 104(b) provides, in part, that
[i]f preliminary questions of conditional relevancy were determined solely by the judge, as provided in subdivision (a), the func-

tioning of the jury as a trier of fact would be greatly restricted
and in some cases virtually destroyed. These are appropriatequestionsfor juries. . . .If after all the evidence on the issue is in, pro
and con, the jury could reasonablyconclude thatfulfillment of the
1
condition is not established,the issue is for [the jury] .

In light of that language, how have the circuits arrived at their
conclusion that rule 104 has eliminated the pre-existing jury function
of determining factually if the condition precedent to relevancy exists? Mechanically, the question is relatively easy to answer: by concluding that rule 104(a), and not rule 104(b), applies to coconspirator declarations." What is considerably more difficult to
determine, however, is the rationale for the judicial conclusion that
rule 104(b) is never applicable to coconspirator declarations.
The rationale offered by some decisions is purportedly predicated on the notion of fairness to the defendant.1 The expressed ju12. FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
13. FED. R. EvID. 104(b).
14. FED. R. EVID. 104(b) advisory committee note (emphasis added).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d 149, 152 (6th Cir. 1979); United States
v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 579-80 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979);
United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, 1133 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Petrozziello,
548 F.2d 20, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1977).
16. The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979), explained:
We must look beyond the language of [Rule 104] to its underlying policies to
determine who should decide the preliminary questions and what standard of proof
should control the decision on admissibility. A rule that puts the admissibility of
coconspirator statements in the hands of the jury does not avoid the danger that the
jury might convict on the basis of these statements without first dealing with the
admissibility question. ...
We are therefore convinced that the preliminary questions of conditional relevancy envisioned by Rule 104(b) are those which present no such danger of
prejudice to the defendant. They are questions of probative force rather than evidentiary policy. They involve questions as to the fulfillment of factual conditions which
the jury must answer.
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dicial concern is that once the jury hears the coconspirator's declaration, the jury will find it difficult, if not impossible, to properly fulfill
its function. First, the jury must decide whether the condition precedent to relevancy (i.e., a conspiracy between defendant and declarant) existed, based only on the independent evidence. Second, assuming a negative finding with regard to the condition precedent, the
jury must disregard the alleged coconspirator's declaration in deciding the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 17 Therefore, fairness to
the defendant demands that the pre-existing jury function be
eliminated.
There are several problems with such a "fairness" rationale.
The first is a basic one: There seems to be absolutely nothing in rule
104(b), or the Advisory Committee's note thereto, which supports
the judicial conclusion that rule 104(a), and not rule 104(b), applies
to coconspirator declarations. Consequently, a judicial determination, based on those rules, which eliminates a long-standing jury
function, is without explicit or implicit support. The second problem
is less mechanical in nature, and of greater significance. Eliminating
the jury function of determining the existence of the condition precedent to relevancy of a coconspirator's declaration does nothing, in
fact, to protect the defendant. Quite the contrary, it eliminates a
protection that the defendant had earlier enjoyed. With that jury
function, there was at least the possibility that the jury might conclude, based on the independent evidence, that no conspiracy between the defendant and the declarant had existed. There was also
the possibility that, given such a factual finding, the jury might, in
accordance with the court's instructions, disregard the declaration in
determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Once that jury
function is eliminated, however, both possibilities are also eliminated
and the defendant loses the potential of an ultimate jury determination to disregard the declaration. That certainly does nothing to benefit the defendant.
The admissibility of a coconspirator's declarations in a conspiracy trial, however, does pose problems precisely because they are relevant. Such evidence endan-

gers the integrity of the trial because the relevancy and apparent probative value of
the statements may be so highly prejudicial as to color other evidence even in the
mind of a conscientious juror, despite instructions to disregard the statements or to
consider them conditionally. As a result, such statements should be evaluated by the
trained legal mind of the trial judge.
Id. at 579. See United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1217-18 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing
United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575 (en banc) (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979)).
17. See supra note 16.
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Ironically, some of the courts which have eliminated that preexisting jury function have recognized that its loss in fact jeopardizes
the defendant. 1" To compensate for that jeopardy, the courts have
elevated the standard of proof which the government's independent
evidence of the conspiracy must meet.19 Previously, the government
had to establish, by independent evidence, a prima facie case of the
existence of a conspiracy between the defendant and the declarant
before the coconspirator's declaration would be admitted.2 0 In that
context, prima facie seemed to mean evidence sufficient to support
an affirmative jury finding. Now, the standard of proof has been
raised to a preponderance of the evidence, 1 which, I gather, is
equivalent to "more likely than not." Under the elevated standard,
the government's independent evidence must make the existence of a
conspiracy between the defendant and the declarant more likely than
not, before the coconspirator's declaration will be admitted and given
to the jury. That is the quid pro quo offered the defendant to compensate him for the loss of the pre-existing jury function of determining the existence of the condition precedent to relevancy. One
wonders if it is an appropriate trade-off.
I do not believe that it is, for several reasons. First, I find it
almost impossible to believe that anyone is capable of distinguishing
between the independent evidence which would justify an affirmative
jury finding of the existence of a conspiracy and the "more demanding" standard of independent evidence which would make the existence of the conspiracy more likely than not. This is not said to denigrate the competence or the evidentiary sensitivity of judges. I am
perfectly willing to accept a judge's capacity to distinguish between
prima facie evidence and evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. I am
even willing to accept a judge's capacity to distinguish between
prima facie evidence and clear and convincing evidence. I believe,
18. See, e.g., United States v. James, 590 F.2d at 580, where the court stated:
It must be borne in mind that the prima facie test was used when the jury also
had a part in determining the use of the statements. ...
Since we now conclude that the trial court has the responsibility for determining those questions of fact relating to admissibility of the statement, the standard by
which the court makes this determination should be high enough to afford adequate
protection to the defendant against whom the evidence is offered. ...
19. See, e.g., United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 603 F.2d 444, 457 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980); United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 582-83 (5th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979); United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20,
23 (1st Cir. 1977).
20. See cases cited supra note 19.
21. Id.
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however, that the distinction between prima facie and more likely
than not is more nebulous than real. I think it is an artificial distinction beyond the ability of the most competent and sensitive judge.
Consequently, I do not believe that the "elevated" standard of evidence affords the defendant any meaningful protection.
Second, some of the circuits which have concluded that rule
104(a), and not rule 104(b), applies to a coconspirator's declaration
have determined that the coconspirator's declaration may be considered in determining whether the government's evidence of the conspiracy between the defendant and the declarant has achieved the
required standard of proof. 22 There is, to be sure, an internal consistency to those conclusions. After all, rule 104(a) provides that "[i]n
making its determination [of the admissibility of evidence, the court]
is not bound by the rules of evidence." '2 3 Therefore, if rule 104(a)
applies, thus eliminating the jury function of rule 104(b), it would
seem to follow, a priori, that the court, both in ruling on the admissibility of the coconspirator's declaration and in determining whether
the government's evidence of the conspiracy has achieved the required standard, would consider the extrajudicial coconspirator's
declaration as a part of the government's evidence. Accepting that
"logical" conclusion, it becomes apparent that, in fact, the government is likely to find it considerably easier to meet the standard of
proof required for the admission of the coconspirator's declaration.
Eliminating the pre-existing requirement of independent evidence of
the conspiracy, and, instead, considering both the independent evidence and the coconspirator's declaration, the court is almost certain
to conclude that the government's evidence of the conspiracy justifies
the admission of the coconspirator's declaration.
Finally, I believe this trade-off is inadequate because it usurps a
legitimate jury function. No matter what the required standard of
22. See, e.g., United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d 149, 153 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1074, 445 U.S. 904 (1980); ef. United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 & n.2
(lst Cir. 1977) (while citing pre-Rules case law in opposition to "bootstrapping of this sort,"
the court-based upon "the logic of the new rule [rule 104(a)]"-leaves room for some consideration of such evidence by trial judges; the court does not, however, finally decide the issue).
Contra United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 581 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
917 (1979).
"The majority of circuits have. . . refus[ed] to permit the 'bootstrapping' of the admissibility of a statement of a conspiracy which is, at least in part, preliminarily proven by that
same statement." Epstein, Joseph & Saltzburg, Emerging Problems Under the FederalRules
of Evidence, 1983 A.B.A. SEc. LITIGATION 246 (citations omitted) (report of the Trial Evidence Committee).
23. FED. R. EvID. 104(a).
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proof may be, and whether or not the extrajudicial declaration is a
part of the evidence which may satisfy the standard, there will continue to be cases in which the alleged coconspirator's declaration,
received in evidence, is relevant evidence of the defendant's guilt
only if the defendant and the declarant were coconspirators. In other
words, there will continue to be coconspirator declarations which are
only conditionally relevant. Where the condition precedent to relevancy is a factual matter, its ultimate resolution should be left with
the traditional fact finder-the jury. If the jury could rationally find
that the condition precedent to relevancy-the existance of a conspiracy between the defendant and the declarant-did not exist, the
jury should be instructed that, given such a finding, it should disregard the alleged declaration in determining the guilt or innocence of
the defendant. Assigning that function exclusively to the court denies
the defendant the potential benefit of a traditional and legitimate
jury function,24 regardless of the standard of proof required for
admissibility.
If eliminating the pre-existing jury function does in fact jeopardize the defendant and if raising the standard of proof required for
the admission of the declaration does not adequately compensate the
defendant for that jeopardy, then the stated rationale, fairness to the
defendant, for the circuits' conclusion that rule 104(b) is not applicable to coconspirator declarations is entirely unpersuasive. What
then is the real reason for that judicial conclusion?
Here I shall attempt to tread lightly. When the stated rationale
for a judicial conclusion proves unpersuasive, it becomes almost impossible not to speculate about alternative explanations. I think there
may be two.
Even before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
when the jury function of determining conditional relevancy existed,
there seemed to be a certain judicial uneasiness with that function.
In the view of some judges, it permitted a jury to "second-guess" the
court's ruling on admissibility. 25 "Once I rule the evidence admissible, no jury has the right to exclude it," represents that particular
judicial perspective. It is a perfectly rational perspective since ruling
on admissibility is exclusively a judicial function. No jury has the
24.

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a.

.

. trial.

. .

by

.. . jury . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
25. "This simple rule seems to me best: what goes into the record is the responsibility of
the judge; what (of this) is credited, that of the jury." United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575,
584 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (Gee, J., specially concurring), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979).
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right to usurp any part of that purely judicial role. Every judge
would be entirely justified in feeling distressed by any such jury effort. There has always been, and continues to be, however, a significant distinction between a judge's ruling on admissibility and a
jury's subsequent factual determination of the existence vel non of
the condition precedent to relevancy. A simple example is offered in
the Advisory Committee's note to rule 104(b): "[I]f a letter purporting to be from Y is relied upon to establish an admission by him, it
has no probative value unless Y wrote or authorized it. Relevance in
this sense has been labeled 'conditional relevancy.' "26
Assume that in a criminal prosecution the government offers
into evidence an inculpating letter, purportedly written by the defendant. Througfh the testimony of a duly qualified handwriting expert,27 or that of a layman familiar with the defendant's handwriting, 28 evidence is presented which would justify a jury's finding that
the defendant wrote the letter. The court admits the letter as an admission. The defense then presents a duly qualified handwriting expert who testifies that, in his opinion, the defendant did not write the
letter. Further, the defendant testifies that he did not write the letter. Ultimately, it will be for the jury to make a factual determination as to whether the defendant did or did not write the letter. If
the jury finds that the defendant did write the letter, it will consider
the letter in deciding the guilt or innocence of the defendant. If the
jury finds that the defendant did not write the letter, it will disregard
the letter in deciding the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Virtually no judge would be disturbed by the jury's performance of its
legitimate function: Determining factually whether or not the condition precedent to relevancy existed. Should the jury conclude that
the defendant did not write the letter, and thus disregard the letter
in deciding the guilt or innocence of the defendant, virtually no
judge would be disturbed by that jury conclusion, notwithstanding
the fact that the judge had ruled the letter admissible. The purely
judicial function of ruling on admissibility and the jury's function of
determining factually the existence of the condition precedent to relevancy are clearly distinguishable. A similar distinction exists with
regard to the purely judicial function of ruling on the admissibility
of a coconspirator's declaration and the jury's subsequent function of
determining factually the existence of the condition precedent to the
26.

FED. R. EvID. 104(b) advisory committee note.

27.

FED. R. EVID. 702.

28.

FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(2).
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relevancy of the declaration. A failure to recognize that distinction
in functions, and a resulting, but mistaken, judicial affront at a
jury's "second-guessing" of the court's ruling on admissibility, is, I
believe, one reason why the circuits have seized upon rule 104(a) as
a basis for concluding that the pre-existing jury function no longer
exists.
The second reason is, I believe, a failure to determine when a
particular coconspirator's declaration is merely conditionally relevant
and when it may be independently relevant. Prior to the enactment
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, many of the circuits treated all
coconspirator declarations as merely conditionally relevant, thus triggering the jury function of determining the existence of the condition
precedent to relevancy in every case.2 9 As was noted previously, since
the effective date of the Rules, all of the circuits to have considered
the question have concluded that rule 104(b) and its treatment of
conditionally relevant evidence is never applicable to coconspirator
declarations. ° In my opinion, both conclusions are incorrect. I also
believe that a tacit judicial uneasiness with the pre-Rules view, that
all coconspirator declarations are conditionally relevant, has contributed to the post-Rules view that all coconspirator declarations are
independently relevant. If a particular coconspirator's declaration is
relevant, regardless of the status of the defendant and the declarant
as coconspirators, there is no need, nor even any propriety, in having
a jury determine the existence of any condition precedent to relevancy. To overcome the defendant's hearsay objection, the court's
ruling on admissibility requires a judicial determination of the existence of a conspiracy between the defendant and the declarant as
well as a determination that the declaration had been made during
the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Once such an affirmative judicial ruling is made, the jury need not make an independent determination of those matters as a condition precedent to consideration of the declaration. If the declaration is independently
relevant, rule 104(b), by its own terms, is inapplicable.
Let us consider a hypothetical example. Defendant Smith is
charged with possession of heroin with the intention of distributing
it. In the government's case, appropriate evidence is offered to prove
that the defendant and the declarant were engaged in a conspiracy
to sell the heroin. A government undercover agent offers to testify
29. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
30, See cases cited supra note 8.
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that, during the course of that conspiracy, the declarant said to the
agent, "Smith will meet you next Monday at midnight to close the
deal." The defendant's hearsay objection will almost certainly be
overruled. Given the government's evidence, the court, applying rule
104(a), would conclude that the declaration was that of a coconspirator of the defendant made during the course and in furtherance
of the conspiracy. Thus, under rule 801(d)(2)(E), the declaration
would be admissible.
Is the admissible declaration independently relevant or only conditionally relevant as to the defendant's guilt or innocence? Before
answering that question, consideration should be given to the question of the admissibility of the declaration over the defendant's hearsay objection. It seems clear that under rule 801(d)(2)(E) the declaration is admissible because a coconspirator's declaration is
considered to be the rough equivalent of a vicarious admission in a
criminal context.31 The fact that the defendant impliedly authorized
the declarant to make the declaration, as a result of the conspiracy
between them, makes the declaration admissible against the defendant over his hearsay objection as a vicarious admission.
Let us assume that, given the evidence presented, the jury could
reasonably conclude factually either that the defendant and the declarant were coconspirators or that they were not. If the jury concluded that they were not, would the declaration allegedly made to
the government agent be relevant as to the guilt or innocence of the
defendant? I believe the answer must be no. If the defendant and the
declarant were not parties to a conspiracy, there would be no basis
for finding that the defendant impliedly authorized the declarant to
speak for him. Therefore, the alleged declaration as to what the defendant would do and when and why, entirely lacking in authority
from the defendant, would be no more than a wholly gratuitous assertion having no legitimate inculpating effect on the defendant. In
other words, the declaration is only conditionally relevant, the condition precedent to relevancy being the existence of a conspiracy between the defendant and the declarant. In those circumstances, rule
31. The limitation upon the admissibility of statements of co-conspirators to those
made "during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy" is in the accepted
pattern. While the broadened view of agency taken in [801(d)(2)(D), vicarious admissions] might suggest wider admissibility of statements of co-conspirators, the
agency theory of conspiracy is at best a fiction and ought not to serve as a basis for
admissibility beyond that already established.
FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee note.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1984

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:453

104(b) should be deemed applicable.
Let us consider a slightly different hypothetical. The charge
against defendant Smith remains the same. Again, the government
offers appropriate evidence to prove that the defendant and the declarant were engaged in a conspiracy to sell the heroin. A government undercover agent offers to testify that, during the course of
that conspiracy, the declarant said to the agent, "I've seen Smith's
stuff and it's top quality." Once more, the defendant's hearsay objection will almost certainly be overruled. Given the government's evidence, the court, applying rule 104(a), would conclude that the declaration was that of a coconspirator of the defendant made during
the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Thus, under rule
801(d)(2)(E), the declaration would be admissible.
Is the admissible declaration independently relevant or only conditionally relevant with regard to the defendant's guilt or innocence?
Again, let us assume that, given the evidence presented, the jury
could reasonably conclude factually either that the defendant and
the declarant were coconspirators or that they were not. If the jury
concluded that they were not, would the declaration allegedly made
to the government agent be relevant as to the guilt or innocence of
the defendant? I believe the answer is yes. Even if the defendant and
the declarant were not parties to a conspiracy, so that the defendant
would not have impliedly authorized the declarant to speak for the
defendant, the declaration is evidence that the defendant possessed
heroin. Given the charge against the defendant, that evidence is relevant evidence of possession. In other words, this declaration is independently, not merely conditionally, relevant. Its relevancy exists irrespective of the existence of a conspiracy between the defendant
and the declarant. The existence of such a conspiracy is a condition
precedent only to admissibility over the defendant's hearsay objection; it is not a condition precedent to relevancy. Consequently, rule
104(b) should be deemed inapplicable.
It seems clear that not all coconspirator declarations are always
conditionally relevant. Yet they were treated as such by some of the
circuits prior to the Federal Rules of Evidence.3 2 Thus, the jury
function of determining the existence of the condition precedent to
relevancy was overused. I believe that the circuits sensed that
overuse, perhaps without realizing its cause. I also believe that the
judicial dissatisfaction with that jury function arose, in part, out of
32. See supra note 3.
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that tacit, perhaps even not fully appreciated, sense of impropriety.
I further believe that the sense of impropriety, felt by judges,
arising out of the overuse of the jury function, contributed to the
judicial overreaction that rule 104(b) is inapplicable to all coconspirator declarations.
The Supreme Court has not yet resolved the issue of the applicability of rule 104(b) to coconspirator declarations. When the
Court does so, however, it should be sensitive to the fact that, while
the existence of a conspiracy is a condition precedent to admissibility under rule 801(d)(2)(E), it is not always a condition precedent to
relevancy. Some coconspirator declarations are independently relevant; as to them, rule 104(b) is inapplicable. Some coconspirator
declarations are only conditionally relevant; as to them, rule 104(b)
is applicable.
III.

RULE

301 AND PRESUMPTIONS IN CIVIL ACTIONS

Rule 301 provides that in all civil actions:
a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the
burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in
the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout
the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.33
Is rule 301 intended to generate a rebuttable presumption or
only a permissible inference? The rule, quite unexpectedly, does not
provide an explicit answer to this basic question. Before attempting
to answer that question, however, a distinction should be made between a rebuttable presumption and a permissible inference.
Let us assume that the plaintiff's evidence of facts A, B, and C
generates a rebuttable presumption of X, the fact to be proven. Let
us also assume that the defendant offers no evidence tending to rebut
X. The plaintiff would be entitled to a jury instruction to the effect
that, if the jury accepts the plaintiff's evidence of facts A, B, and C,
they must accept X. That is a rebuttable presumption. If the fact
finder accepts the evidence generating the presumption, and no rebutting evidence is offered, the fact finder must accept the
presumption. 4
33. FED. R. EVID. 301.
34. Although some courts have described such a standardized [permissible] inference as a presumption, most legal scholars have disagreed. They have saved the
term [presumption] to describe a significantly different sort of a rule, one that dic-
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Now let us define a permissible inference. Assume that the
plaintiff's evidence of facts A, B, and C generates only a permissible
inference of X, the fact to be proven, and the defendant offers no
evidence tending to rebut X. The jury would be instructed that, even
if it accepts the plaintiffs evidence of facts A, B, and C, and even
though the defendant offered no rebutting evidence, the jury remains
free to accept or reject X. That is what makes it only a permissible
inference. Even if the fact finder accepts the evidence generating the
inference, and even though no rebutting evidence is offered,
the fact
35
finder remains free to accept or reject the inference.
The language of rule 301 seems to suggest a rebuttable presumption. Although the language of the rule does not explicitly shift
the ultimate burden of persuasion onto the party against whom the
presumption arises, it does explicitly impose on that party the burden
of presenting rebutting evidence. That burden can be meaningful
only if X, the fact to be proven, is treated as a rebuttable
presumption.
The Conference Committee Report regarding rule 301 reads, in
part, as follows:
Under the Senate amendment, a presumption is sufficient to get a
party past an adverse party's motion to dismiss made at the end of
his case-in-chief. If the adverse party offers no evidence contradicting the presumedfact, the court will instruct the jury that if it
finds the basic facts, it may presume the existence of the presumed

fact ...
The Conference adopts the Senate amendment.

6

tates not only that the establishment of fact B is sufficient to satisfy a party's burden of producing evidence with regard to fact A, but also at least compels the shifting of the burden of producing evidence on the question to his adversary. Under this
view, if proof of fact B is introduced and a presumption exists to the effect that fact
A can be inferred from fact B, the party denying the existence of fact A must then
introduce proof of its nonexistence or risk having a verdict directed against him.
MCCORMICK's EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 342, at 803 (2d ed. 1972) (footnotes omitted).
35. This means that the inference ... to be drawn from the circumstances is left
to the jury. They are permitted, but not compelled to find it. The plaintiff escapes a
nonsuit, or a dismissal of his case, since there is sufficient evidence to go to the jury;
but the burden of proof is not shifted to the defendant's shoulders, nor is any "burden" of introducing evidence cast upon him, except in the very limited sense that if
he fails to do so, he runs the risk that the jury may, and very likely will, find against
him.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 229 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted).
36. Comm. of Conf. Rep. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7098, 7099.
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A mere permissible inference is "sufficient to get a party past an
adverse party's motion to dismiss made at the end of his case-inchief." More significantly, it is only with a permissible inference that
the court would instruct the jury that, absent any rebutting evidence
and even though the jury "finds the basic facts, it may presume the
existence of the presumed fact." In such circumstances, a rebuttable
presumption would require an instruction directing the jury that it
must accept the presumed fact. The Conference Committee's language seems to have contemplated that rule 301 provides for a mere
permissible inference. The language of the rule suggests a rebuttable
presumption while the language of the Conference Committee (a significant source of legislative intent) implies a permissible inference.
This conflict is further complicated by two additional factors. In
the rule originally submitted by the Supreme Court, "presumptions
• ..were given the effect of placing upon the opposing party the
burden of establishing the nonexistence of the presumed fact, once
the party invoking the presumption established the basic facts giving
rise to it."13 7 Congress rejected the concept of having a presumption
shift the ultimate burden of persuasion. Consequently, the pre-legislative history of rule 301 is of little help in determining congressional
intent. Moreover, the disagreement between the House and the Senate centered on the "bursting bubble" theory. The House version
provided that, "'even though met with contradicting evidence, a presumption is sufficient evidence of the fact presumed, to be considered
by the trier of fact.'"38 "The effect of the [House] amendment
[was] that presumptions [were] to be treated as evidence."3 The
Senate rejected that approach and apparently adopted, instead, the
"bursting bubble" approach. Under the "bursting bubble" theory,
the introduction of rebutting evidence causes the presumption to disappear, and the jury is instructed to weigh evidence against evidence. 40 The Conference Committee expressly adopted the Senate
amendment. 4 ' It appears, however, that neither the Senate nor the
House directed much attention to the distinction between a rebuttable presumption and a permissible inference. Rather, both Houses
focused their concern on the status of the presumption after it was
37. S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U. S.
& AD. NEws 7051, 7055.
38. Id. at 7056.

CODE CONG.

39. Id.
40. See id.
41. See supra text accompanying note 36.
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met with rebutting evidence. In those circumstances, there is little, if
any, practical difference between a rebuttable presumption and a
permissible inference. Given an apparent conflict between the language of the rule and the language of the Conference Committee,
with little or no help from pre-legislative history or from the difference of opinion between House and Senate, what is a poor judge to
do?
Unfortunately, I am not able to tell you what the courts have
done, because I have found no case which explicitly determines
whether rule 301 was intended to generate a rebuttable presumption
or a permissible inference. There is, however, the Supreme Court's
opinion in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine.42 In Burdine, a Title VII43 employment discrimination suit, the Court found
that the plaintiff's evidence created a rebuttable presumption of discrimination on the part of defendant." The Court held, however,
that the presumption did not shift the ultimate burden of persuasion
onto the defendant; rather, "[tihe plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion."' 5 What the rebuttable presumption favoring the plaintiff
does is the following: (1) "If the trier of fact believes the plaintiff's
evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption,
the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of
fact remains in the case;
(2) On the other hand, if the employer
offers evidence "to rebut the presumption of discrimination, ' 47 the
ultimate burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff.4 That opinion of the Court would appear to be entirely consistent with the explicit language of rule 301 that a presumption does not shift the ultimate burden of persuasion but that it does impose on the adverse
party a "burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the
presumption."' 9 Moreover, the Burdine opinion would be consistent
with the apparent intent of the language of rule 301, and inconsistent with the contrary suggestion of the Conference Committee Report, that rule 301 contemplates a rebuttable presumption, not
merely a permissible inference. In light of this, why not read Burdine as an explicit interpretation of rule 301 by the Supreme Court?
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

450 U.S. 248 (1981).
See generally 42 U.S.C. §§2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
See 450 U.S. at 252, 254 & n.7.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 254.
Id.
Id. at 254-56.

49.

FED. R. EvID. 301.
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The short answer is that the Court, in Burdine, merely cited rule 301
in a footnote, and did so without elaboration."
Would it nevertheless be appropriate to conclude that rule 301
is applicable to the issue resolved by the Court in Burdine, and that,
therefore, Burdine should be deemed dispositive of the issue even absent elaborate discussion of rule 301? By its own terms, rule 301 is
applicable to "all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by these rules. 51 I know of no other
provision in congressional enactments (nor did the Burdine Court
cite any), or in the Federal Rules of Evidence, regulating the presumption arising in a Title VII action; presumably, then, rule 301
applies. Moreover, the Court in Burdine, like Congress, ultimately
embraced the "bursting bubble" theory.5 2 Apparently, both considered and resolved that issue. Since both the Court and Congress
dealt with the procedural effect to be given a presumption and since
the language of rule 301 suggests its applicability to Burdine, I am
inclined to read that case as a tacit conclusion by the Court that rule
a rebuttable presumption, not a mere permissible
301 contemplates
53
inference.
I find this reading of rule 301 preferable for another reason. As
was previously discussed, the basic dispute between Senate and
House concerned the "bursting bubble" theory and the basic thrust
of the Conference Report, and its use of the word "may", seems
clearly to have been directed toward that dispute. Frankly, I do not
believe that either the House Committee or the Conference Committee directed serious attention to the distinction between a rebuttable
presumption and a permissible inference. In those circumstances, it
seems more appropriate to give effect to the apparent intent of the
rule itself-a rebuttable presumption-rather than to the Conference Committee's use of the single word "may" and its suggestion of
50. 450 U.S. at 255 n.8.
51.

FED. R. EvID. 301.

52. See 450 U.S. at 255 n.10.
53.

In Burdine, the Court's conclusions as to the effect of the presumption generated by

the plaintiff's evidence rest on the Court's earlier decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The Court's opinion in Burdine notes that it was in McDonnell
Douglas that "we set forth the basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in
a Title VII case alleging discriminatory treatment." 450 U.S. at 252 (footnote omitted). Since

the McDonnell Douglas Corp. decision was a pre-Rules decision, one could conclude that, in
Burdine, the Court had simply overlooked the direct applicability of rule 301. I find it a more
felicitous reading of Burdine to infer that the Court tacitly concluded that rule 301 contem-

plated a rebuttable presumption.
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a permissible inference. 4 Consequently, I believe that the presumption governed by rule 301 is a rebuttable presumption.
That conclusion leads to another surprising result. A res ipsa
loquitur case brought in a state court may have the procedural effect
of generating either a rebuttable presumption of negligence or a
mere permissible inference of negligence, depending on the particular state, and in some states, depending on the particular facts. 5
Given that disparity in treatment by the states, how should a federal
court react to a res ipsa case? If the case is in federal court on diversity grounds, rule 302 provides a quick and easy answer: "the effect
of a presumption . . . is determined in accordance with State law."' 6
What procedural effect should be given to the case, however, if it is
in federal court as a federal cause of action, such as an action
brought pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act 7 or the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 58 and the plaintiffs evidence generates a
res ipsa case? In those circumstances, I believe rule 301 applies. I
have already concluded that rule 301 contemplates a rebuttable presumption, not a mere permissible inference. The unexpected result
here is that the applicability of rule 301 to a res ipsa case in a federal cause of action seems not to have been discerned.
For instance, in Wilson v. United States,59 the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the granting of the defendant's motion to dismiss. The
plaintiff argued that his evidence had generated a res ipsa case of
54. There exists persuasive and scholarly support for that conclusion:
The only change that the Senate Committee stated that it wanted to make was
deletion of the provision in the House draft that would treat presumptions as evidence. The Senate Committee did not indicate that it wanted to weaken the traditional force of presumptions ...
Thus, we conclude that the Senate Committee, and ultimately the Conferees,
were confused as to the traditional Thayer approach to presumptions and that there
is no demonstrable intention on the part of the Congress to depart from the traditional approach. We recognize that the language of both the Senate Committee
Report and the Conferees' Report can be read otherwise, but we do not believe that
the cryptic wording concerning a permissive instruction to be given a jury represents
the view of the House Committee

. .

. or the Senate Committee. .

.

. Thus, we

believe that both Houses of Congress thought they were adopting the [traditional]
approach and that the Rule should be read as if they did.
K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 68 (3d ed. 1982). See
generally M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE 114-15 (1981) (detailing the appliS. SALTZBURG &

cation of the "Thayer 'bursting bubble' approach to presumptions").
55.
56.
57.

See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 228-31 (4th ed. 1971).
FED. R. EVID. 302.
28 U.S.C. §§1346(b), 2401(b), 2402, 2671-80 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).

58. See generally 45 U.S.C. §§51-60 (1976).
59. 645 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1981).
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negligence, but the Ninth Circuit noted that the trial "judge found
that [the plaintiff's] evidence did not support an inference of negligence. This is a finding of fact. It is not clearly erroneous .
,"6oIf
that language was intended to mean that the plaintiff's evidence did
not create a legally sufficient res ipsa case, I have no serious quarrel
with the language or the result. Earlier on, however, the court's opinion reads: "In this circuit, the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur simply makes it permissible to draw an inference of negligence from a set of facts. Invocation of the doctrine does not establish a presumption of negligence or shift the burden of proof."'6 1 That
language troubles me. Given a federal cause of action to which rule
301 applies and a res ipsa case, I do not believe the various circuits
are free to determine independently the procedural effect to be given.
Congress has made that decision. Rule 301, while not shifting the
ultimate burden of persuasion, does impose on the adverse party "the
burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the
presumption. ' 2
If our reading of legislative intent is correct, then Congress has
mandated a rebuttable presumption, not a mere permissible inference. Is rule 301 applicable to a res ipsa loquitur case in a federal
cause of action? I believe the answer is yes. Congress apparently
concluded that there should be one basic rule governing presumptions in federal causes of action, whether a particular presumption
was based on social policy or logical inference. 3 Thus, whether the
presumption of negligence in a res ipsa case is the product of policy
or logic, it should be governed by rule 301. Further, given our reading of the rule, the presumption provided for is a rebuttable
presumption.

IV.

RULE

407,

SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES AND STRICT
LIABILITY ACTIONS

Rule 407, entitled "Subsequent Remedial Measures," provides
that any remedial measures taken after the event that gave rise to
the cause of action are "not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event." Such evidence, however,
60.
61.
62.
63.
grounds

Id. at 731.
Id. at 730.
FED. R. EVID. 301.

"We believe that Congress intended that presumptions [, whether resting on policy
or logic and probability,1 would be treated uniformly under Rule 301 .
S.
SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 54, at 67.
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may be admitted for other purposes, "such as proving ownership,
control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or
impeachment."8 4 The rule seems to be fairly consistent with the preRules practice 5 and apparently rests on the same policy consideration: "encouraging people to take, or at least not discouraging them
from taking, steps in furtherance of added safety." 8 If a defendant
or a potential defendant knew that remedial measures effected after
injury would be admissible evidence against him in a case brought
by the injured party, the defendant (actual or potential) might be
dissuaded from effecting such measures, with a resulting loss of
safety to society as a whole. Then why the exception when such evidence is offered to prove ownership, control, or feasibility, "if controverted"? The answer seems to be that, while ownership, control, or
feasibility might become a critical issue in a particular case, no issue
is likely to be as conclusively determinative as fault. As to those less
determinative issues, the defendant has a practical option: he can
avoid the admissibility of the remedial measures by admitting ownership, control, or feasibility, or he can controvert the assertion and
suffer admission of the evidence.
The conclusion reached by the Eighth Circuit in several
cases-that the exclusion of evidence of subsequent repairs under
rule 407 is inapplicable to strict liability cases 67 -is surprising. For
example, in Unterburger v. Snow Co.,88 the plaintiff sought damages
from defendant ("Snowco") "for injuries he suffered in a grain auger accident." 69 Snowco had manufactured the auger.7 0 "Unterburger's fingers came into contact with moving parts [of the auger], drawing his arm in so that it became entangled with the lower
end of the uncovered main drive shaft. Unterburger's arm had to be
amputated just below the elbow." 7 1 The plaintiff alleged that the auger had been defective because of the absence of an effective guard
64.
65.

FED. R. EvID. 407.
See Falknor, Extrinsic Policies Affecting Admissibility, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 574,

590-92 (1956).
66. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note. See Falknor, supra note 65, at 590-91.
67. See, e.g., Unterburger v. Snow Co., 630 F.2d 599, 603 (8th Cir. 1980); Farner v.
Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518, 528 (8th Cir. 1977); Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal
Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 792-93 (8th Cir. 1977). For a discussion of Unterburger,see infra text

accompanying notes 68-76.
68. 630 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1980).
69. Id. at 601. "A grain auger is a device used to move grain short distances for storage
or shipment." Id.

70. Id.
71.

Id. at 602.
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mechanism.7 2 Evidence was received indicating that subsequent
models made by Snowco had a modified guard system. 73 Snowco appealed from a judgment for the plaOintiff.7 4 Snowco asserted "that
the district court committed prejudicial error by failing to limit the
evidence and testimony regarding . . . the modified Snowco auger.
Snowco contend[ed] that this . . . was evidence of a subsequent remedial measure, inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 407. . . ."' The

Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that Snowco's "argument lacks
merit. As the district court noted at trial, Fed. R. Evid. 407 does not
apply to actions based on strict liability; hence this evidence was admissible under the strict liability count." 6
The plaintiff had both strict liability and negligence theories
submitted to the jury. 7 Of principal concern, however, is the legal
conclusion that rule 407 "does not apply to actions based on strict
78
liability."
It is true, of course, that rule 407 excludes evidence of subsequent measures when offered to prove "negligence or culpable conduct." It is also true that strict liability according to section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 9 may be imposed irrespective of
negligence. Even the Restatement, however, requires, as a condition
precedent to liability, that a defendant sell a defective and unreasonably dangerous product.80 The sale of a defective product implies
fault or "culpable conduct." The Advisory Committee's note to rule
407 states: "The rule incorporates conventional doctrine which excludes evidence of subsequent remedial measures as proof of an admission of fault."81 Moreover, the basic policy reason for rule 407
would seem to be particularly applicable to the manufacturer. A
Section 402A defendant must be engaged in the business of selling
72.

Id.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 601.
Id. at 603.
Id.
Id. at 601. I confess I find it somewhat difficult to accept the jury's ability to con-

sider the evidence of modification as to the strict liability theory and disregard it as to negli-

gence. But only somewhat, since I have enormous faith in the competence and conscientiousness of juries.
78. 630 F.2d at 603.
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
80. "One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user of consumer. . . is subject to liability. . . ." Id. at § 402A(1) (1965).

81.

FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note.
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such products.82 This requirement implies that thousands, perhaps
tens of thousands, of people will have continuing contact with the
defendant's products. The well-being of those users and consumers
will be enhanced if the manufacturer is not dissuaded from improving the product's safety features by a concern that such improvements will be admissible evidence in personal injury and wrongful
death actions arising before the improvements are implemented.
In 1983, in DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories,3 the Eighth
Circuit explained the basis of its earlier decision in Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Association"' stating: "[T]he 'public policy' assumption justifying [rule 407]-that modifications would not
be made in the absence of the rule-is invalid in products liability
actions because the manufacturer of mass-produced goods is motivated by economic self-interest to make the product safer. ' 85 That
statement may have some validity. If it is valid, it confronts the
manufacturer with an economic riddle. The Eighth Circuit's view assumes that potential liability arising from subsequent product use
will compel the manufacturer to make the change, even at the cost
of having that change received in evidence in all cases arising from
prior product use. Still, the manufacturer would be put to the economic task of determining which course of conduct-product modification or nonmodification-is likely to produce the greater liability.
That economic task may be complicated by the manufacturer's belief that a safety modification may make the product less attractive
to the public. With all of the calculations thus imposed on the manufacturer, I am inclined to think that the public's safety is better
served by a rule that would exclude evidence of modifications, thus
making it somewhat more likely that the manufacturer will effect
such changes.
Indeed, even the Eighth Circuit has seen fit to limit its interpretation of rule 407. In Deluryea, the plaintiff asserted that her use of
the defendant's pharmaceutical product had caused serious tissue
damage and that the package insert accompanying the product at
the time of plaintiff's use contained no adequate warning of such a
risk.88 Subsequently, the package insert was modified to reflect such
82. The seller is subject to liability if "the seller is engaged in the business of selling
such a product. . . ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(a) (1965).
83. 697 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1983).
84. 552 F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1977).
85. DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories, 697 F.2d at 228.
86. Id. at 223-24.
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a risk more explicitly.87 Appealing from a judgment for the plaintiff,
the defendant asserted that the district court had erred in receiving
evidence of the modified package insert. 88 The Eighth Circuit concluded that its earlier opinions holding rule 407 inapplicable to strict
liability cases did "not apply to the circumstances in this case." 8'
The distinction drawn by the court rested on two facts: (1) that
DeLuryea involved an alleged failure to warn, 90 and (2) that the
product was an unavoidably unsafe pharmaceutical product, 91 thus
triggering application of comment k to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.92 Those facts led the court to conclude that,
in DeLuryea "the standard[s] for liability under strict liability and
negligence are essentially the same. '93 Consequently, "Rule 407 requires exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial changes in [the
defendant's] warning literature. 91 4 I believe that the similarity between "the standards for liability under strict liability and negligence," which the court found in DeLuryea, exists in virtually all
strict liability cases. It is not surprising, therefore, that DeLuryea
has marked a change in direction by the Eighth Circuit as to the
applicability of rule 407 to strict liability cases."
There is one additional reason that leads me to believe that rule
407 should be deemed applicable to strict liability cases. The second
87. Id. at 227-28.
88.

Id. at 227.

89. See Id. at 228.
90. Id. at 228-29.
91. Id. at 229.
92. See id. Comment k of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states in
part:

Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present
state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended

and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs... .Such a
product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is
not defective, nor is it unreasonablydangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965) (emphasis in original). Comment k is cited in DeLuryea, 697 F.2d at 229.

93.

697 F.2d at 229.

94.

Id.

95. See, e.g., Kehm v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1983). In
Kehm, the court noted that "[s]ince the trial court's decision in this case, this court had refined and qualified its position that negligence-like considerations do not come into play in
products liability cases." 724 F.2d at 621 (discussing DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories, 697

F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1983)).
In Kehm, the court concluded that rule 407 would be applicable even though the product

involved was not an inherently and unavoidably unsafe product, such as a pharmaceutical
product. See 724 F.2d at 621.
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sentence of rule 407, setting forth those instances in which evidence
of remedial measures may be admitted, does not contain a general
exception for strict liability cases. Consequently, I believe that the
conclusion that rule 407 is not applicable to strict liability cases is
not required by the language of the rule. Because that conclusion is
not required by the rule and because it is contrary to the basic policy
reason for the rule, I believe that construction of rule 407 should be
rejected.
V.

RULE

501 AND PRIVILEGE ISSUES IN DIVERSITY CASES

Rule 501 provides that in diversity cases, "the privilege of a wit6
ness . . . shall be determined in accordance with State law."
In a choice-of-law situation, however, concerning the privilege
issue, a question arises as to which state's law a federal court should
apply.
Does the Rule require the federal court to resolve the choice-of-law
problem as it would be resolved by the highest appellate court of
the state in which the federal district court sits, and apply that
state privilege law which that court would apply, or does the Rule
permit the federal district court to resolve the choice-of-law problem independently and apply that state privilege law which seems
most appropriate to the federal district court? Put another way,
does Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric ManufacturingCo.[, 313 U.S.
487 (1941),] govern the determination of a choice-of-law privilege
issue under . . . Rule 501 7
Some commentators thought Klaxon should be deemed applicable, 98
others thought not. 9 The federal courts have concluded that Klaxon
96. FED. R. EvID. 501.
97. Seidelson, The FederalRules of Evidence: Rule 501, Klaxon and the Constitution,
5 HOFSTRA L. REv. 21, 22 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Seidelson, Rule 501].
In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), the Supreme Court
held that:
The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court [exercising diversity
jurisdiction in a particular state] must conform to those prevailing in [the courts of
the state wherein the federal court sits] ....
It is not for the federal courts to
thwart such local policies by enforcing an independent "general law" of conflict of
laws.
Id. at 496 (footnote omitted).
98. See, e.g., 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 501[02], at 50123 (1982) ("The courts ... since the enactment of Rule 501, have, for the most part, continued to apply Klaxon."); Seidelson, Rule 501, supra note 97, at 26-29.
99. With the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence it has been suggested
that the premises underlying the Klaxon opinion have been swept away. This would
authorize the federal courts, for the first time, to adopt a federal choice-of-laws rule

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol12/iss2/6

24

Seidelson: The Federal Rules of Evidence: A Few Surprises
1984]

FEDERAL RULES

does apply. 10 0 Perhaps the most influential case dealing with this issue is Samuelson v. Susen.1 01 The plaintiff in Samuelson, an Ohio
neurosurgeon, sued two physicians, asserting defamation and tortious
interference with business and professional relations.1 02 The diversity
action was brought in a federal district court sitting in Pennsylvania.10 3 The plaintiff sought to depose six physicians and administrators of two Ohio hospitals. 4 Deponents sought protective orders,1 0 5
based on an Ohio statute which extended a privilege to matters relating to medical evaluation and review committees.1 08 The Third Circuit wrote, "We believe Rule 501 requires a district court exercising
diversity jurisdiction to apply the law of privilege which would be
applied by the courts of the state in which it sits. '' 07 Looking to the
choice-of-law decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the
Third Circuit concluded that if the Pennsylvania court were faced
with this case, it would apply the privilege law of the state of
Ohio.1 0
After reviewing the pre-legislative and legislative history of rule
501,109 the Samuelson court found that:
geared to giving privileges the effect they were designed to have.
J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 98, 501[02], at 501-23 (footnotes omitted) (citing

Berger, Privileges, Presumptions and Competency of Witnesses in FederalCourt: A Federal
Choice-of-Laws Rule, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 417 (1976)); see, e.g., Berger, Privileges, Presumptions and Competency of Witnesses in Federal Court: A Federal Choice-of-Laws Rule,
42 BROOKLYN L. REV., 417, 438-45, 449 (1976); Ladd, (Symposium on the Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence) Privileges, 1969 LAw & THE SOCIAL ORDER 555, 570 (1969)(privileges
are procedural, thus not even Erie applies); Note, Federal Rules of Privilege in Diversity
Cases: A Time for CongressionalAction, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1217 (1974)(privilege rules
are procedural, thus they are not covered even by Erie).
100. See, e.g., Samuelson v. Susen, 576 F.2d 546 (3d Cir. 1978); Mazzella v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 479 F.Supp. 523, 526 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) ("[I]n determining which
State's law of privilege applies, the court must look to [the forum state's] conflict of law
rules. ') (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)); Union Planters
Nat'l Bank v. ABC Records, 82 F.R.D. 472, 473 (W.D. Tenn. 1979) ("This Court agrees with
both the reasoning and the holding of Samuelson v. Susen ... to the effect that Rule 501
requires a district court exercising diversity jurisdiction to apply the law of privilege which
would be applied by the courts of the state in which it sits."). For a discussion of Samuelson,
see infra text accompanying notes 101-10.
101. 576 F.2d 546 (3d Cir. 1978); see cases cited supra note 80.
102. 576 F.2d at 548.
103. Id. at 546.
104. Id. at 548.
105. Id.
106. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§2305.25, 2305.251 (Page 1981 & Supp. 1982).

107. 576 F.2d at 549.
108. See id. at 551.
109. Id. at 549-50.
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[a] federal court's application of the law of privilege which the forum states' courts would apply in cases like the instant one, seems
to us to be consistent with Congress' goal of effectuating state substantive rights, laws and policies in controversies where there is no
substantial federal interest. Such an approach furthers Congress'
goal of preserving the domain of state privilege law in diversity
cases by achieving outcome identity between state and federal
courts of the forum state on choice of law, thus discouraging forum
shopping. Such an approach also takes cognizance of the fact that
a forum state's choice-of-law rules may reflect important policy underpinnings of its own law and are an integral part of it. 110
That conclusion and its rationale surprise me only because they are
entirely consistent with the conclusion I reached and the rationale I
developed eight years ago."'
There is, however, a limitation on the applicability of Klaxon to
privilege issues in a diversity case. If the diversity court concludes
that the choice-of-law result which would be achieved by the highest
appellate court of the forum state is unconstitutional, the diversity
court would not be required, or even permitted, to utilize it.112
That limitation was reinforced by the United States Supreme
Court decision in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague."" The Court affirmed the Minnesota choice-of-law decision to apply its own local
law, permitting the stacking 1 4 of uninsured motorist coverage,
rather than Wisconsin's local law prohibiting such stacking. The
Court concluded that Minnesota's decision was permissible under the
full faith and credit clause 15 and consistent with the insurance carrier's right of due process 16 because of Minnesota's "significant contact[s,]. . . creating state interests, with the parties and the occurrence or transaction [giving rise to the litigation],.11 Absent such
contacts, the Minnesota court would have been precluded constitutionally from applying its own local law.1 18
How does Hague apply to rule 501? If a diversity court con110. Id. at 550.
111. See Seidelson, Rule 501, supra note 97, at 26-29.
112. See Id. at 36-38.
113. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
114. "Stacking" insurance coverage is achieved by combining the separate coverage on
each automobile held by an owner to provide a higher total coverage amount to that owner.
See generally Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 305-07 (1981).
115. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
116. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
117. See 449 U.S. at 308 (footnote omitted).
118. See id. at 308, 310-13.
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fronted with a privilege issue looks to the choice-of-law result which
would be achieved by the highest court of the forum state, as rule
501 and Samuelson indicate it should, 119 and the court finds that the
result would be violative of either the full faith and credit clause or
the due process rights of the litigant adversely affected, then it
should eschew that result. The result would be constitutionally impermissible if the privilege law which the highest court of the forum
state would apply was that of a state having no interest in the issue. 120 Let us consider a hypothetical example.1 2 The plaintiff brings
a libel action against the defendant, a newspaper publisher, in a federal district court sitting in State A and exercising diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiff seeks to depose the newsman who wrote the allegedly libelous article. Pursuant to a stipulation entered into by the
parties, the deposition is to take place in State B. During the course
of the deposition, the newsman is asked, and refuses to answer, questions regarding the identity of his sources, asserting that he had assured his sources confidentiality. The plaintiff then seeks an order
from a federal district court judge in State B directing the newsman
to reveal his sources. The deponent asserts the newsman's privilege
statute of State A as the basis for his refusal to answer, noting that
his relationship with his sources existed exclusively in State A. State
B has no similar privilege statute.
The federal judge in State B, confronted with a choice-of-law
problem relating to a privilege issue in a diversity case, should recognize that rule 501 and Samuelson direct him to resolve that issue as
it would be resolved by the highest appellate court of State B. 122 Let
us assume that the court's examination of the decisions of that state
court lead to the conclusion that State B would apply its own local
law, which contains no privilege, but rather, compels the deponent to
reveal his sources. Should the federal court in State B so rule? I
think not.
Presumably, the underlying reason for the newsman's privilege
in State A is to encourage reluctant sources to "open up" to newsmen, thus tending to assure a more informative press and a better
informed citizenry. Since the relationship between the informants
and the newsman existed exclusively in State A, that state would
119. See supra notes 100 & 107-10 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.

121.

The facts of this hypothetical (but not the local laws) are fashioned after In re

Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
122. See supra notes 100 & 107-10 and accompanying text.
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seem to have a significant interest in the application of its protective
local law. The reason underlying State B's local law-no newsman's
privilege-is, presumably, a determination that preserving the integrity of the judicial process requires the evidentiary availability of the
identity of even confidential sources. Does that reason, by itself, create a significant interest on the part of State B? I believe the answer
is no. State B is simply the deposition state, thus its role is merely
ancillary to the role of State A. State B really has no inherent or
self-serving need for the information sought from the deponent. Consequently, State B has no significant interest in the issue which
would be furthered by the application of its own local law. Under
Hague, application of State B's local law by a State B court would
violate both the full faith and credit and due process clauses.12 3 Application of that law by the federal "deposition" court sitting in
State B would be similarly unconstitutional. 124 In those circumstances, therefore, the federal court in State B should apply the
newsman's privilege law of State A and deny plaintiff's requested
order directing deponent to reveal his confidential sources.
To summarize, I acquiesce wholly in the Samuelson conclusion
that a diversity court confronted with a choice-of-law privilege issue
is required by rule 501 to resolve that issue precisely as it would be
resolved by the highest appellate court of the state in which the district court sits, with the following caveat: so long as that state court
would apply the privilege law of a state having a legitimate interest
in the privilege issue thus resolved. Absent such an interest, the
choice-of-law result would be unconstitutional and, therefore, neither
1 25
binding on nor available to the diversity court.

VI.

RULE

803(3) : THE

STATE OF MIND EXCEPTION AND THE
LIMITATION ON Hillmon

Rule 803(3) provides, in part, that a "statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind" may be received over a hearsay
objection.1 2 This rule, however, expressly excludes from the hearsay
exception "a statement of memory of belief [offered] to prove the
fact remembered or believed."1 27 Any discussion of the state of mind
123. See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
124. See id.
125. See, e.g., Mitsui & Co. v. Puerto Rico Water Resources Auth., 79 F.R.D. 72, 79
(D.P.R. 1978).
126. FED. R. EvID. 803(3).
127. Id.
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exception to the hearsay rule, and certainly one focusing on rule
803(3), must begin with the Supreme Court's decision in Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon.1 23 In Hillmon, the defendant insurance companies denied a claim made on a life insurance policy covering Hillmon. The defendants asserted that the body found at
Crooked Creek, Kansas, was that of one Walters, rather than that of
the insured. 129 The Supreme Court held that two letters written by
Walters, one to his fiancee 3 0 and one to his sister,1 31 both indicating
Walter's intention to travel to Crooked Creek with Hillmon, should
have been admitted 3 2 as evidence tending to show that Walters's
body was the body found at Crooked Creek. 133 The Court concluded
that "[tihe letters in question were competent . . . as evidence that
... [Walters] had the intention of going, and of going with
Hillmon, which made it more probable that he did go and that he
128.
129.
130.

145 U.S. 285 (1892).
Id. at 285, 87.
Walters's letter written to his fiancde:

Wichita, March 1, 1879
Dearest Alvina: Your kind and ever welcome letter was received yesterday afternoon about an hour before I left Emporia. I will stay here until the fore part of
next week, and then will leave here to see a part of the country that I never expected to see when I left home, as I am going with a man by the name of Hillmon,
who intends to start a sheep ranch, and as he promised me more wages than I could
make at anything else I concluded to take it, for a while at least, until I strike
something better. There is so many folks in this country that have got the Leadville
fever, and if I could not of got the situation that I have now I would have went there
myself; but as it is at present I get to see the best portion of Kansas, Indian Territory, Colorado, and Mexico. The route that we intend to take would cost a man to
travel from $150 to $200, but it will not cost me a cent; besides, I get good wages. I
will drop you a letter occassionally until I get settled down; then I want you to
answer it.
Id. at 288-89.
131. Walters's letter written to his sister:
Wichita, Kansas
March 4th or 5th or 3d or 4th I don't know - 1879
Dear sister and all: I now in my usual style drop you a few lines to let you
know that I expect to leave Wichita on or about March the 5th, with a certain Mr.
Hillmon, a sheep-trader, for Colorado or parts unknown to me. I expect to see the
country now. News are of no interest to you, as you are not acquainted here. I will
close with compliments to all inquiring friends. Love to all.
I am truly your brother,
FRED. ADOLPH WALTERS

Id. at 288.
132. Id. at 299-300.
133. See id. at 295-96.
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There is an apparent conflict between
went with Hillmon ....
that language and rule 803(3). The Court in Hillmon held that the
state of mind declarations set forth in the letters were admissible not
only to prove that the declarant, Walters, planned a particular itinerary, but also, that he planned to travel with Hillmon. With regard
to that latter element, Walters must have been relying on his belief
that Hillmon planned a similar itinerary. Rule 803(3) explicitly provides that a state of mind declaration may not be received to prove
the existence of the fact believed by the declarant.
The Advisory Committee's note to rule 803(3) provides: "The
rule of [Hillmon,].

.

. allowing evidence of intention as tending to

prove the doing of the act intended, is, of course, left undisturbed."13 5 The Report of the House Judiciary Committee, however,
states that "the Committee intends that the Rule [803(3)] be construed to limit the doctrine of

.

.. Hillmon . . . so as to render

statements of intent by a declarant admissible only to prove his future conduct, not the future conduct of another person."136 Obviously, the House Committee's Report, which is potent evidence of
legislative intent, takes precedence over the pre-legislative Advisory
Committee's note. Rather clearly, then, rule 803(3) was intended to
circumscribe the Hillmon opinion; Walters's declarations today
would be admissible as evidence of his future travel, but not that of
Hillmon. Why did Congress find that limitation necessary?
Perhaps we should begin with a somewhat broader question:
Why is the state of mind declaration treated as an exception to the
hearsay rule? I believe the elements of competence, contemporaneousness and ingenuousness are the basis for this hearsay exception.
As I explained several years ago:
[E]ach of us is "the world's foremost authority" as to our own state
of mind. Our manifestations of that state of mind, therefore, come
from the most competent source possible, at least in terms of capacity to know the state of mind. If, in addition to recognizing that
capacity, it is possible to negate substantially any error of recollection and any motive to be disingenuous in regard to the declaration
manifesting the state of mind, the circumstances would bespeak
trustworthiness in the most emphatic manner. Consequently, a declaration evidencing the declarant's presently existing state of mind
.. . made in circumstances where the declarant would have no
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. FED. R. EvID. 803(3) advisory committee note.
136. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1974) (emphasis added).
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reason to misrepresent his state of mind . . . would be an extrajudicial declaration resting on a substantial foundation of
137
trustworthiness.
In Hillmon, the declarant's statements regarding his own travel
plans were made contemporaneously with his state of mind and were
made to his fiancee and to his sister. Thus, those statements satisfy
adequately the three elements which form the basis for this hearsay
exception. The declarant's statements made in the letters regarding
Hillmon's travel plans, however, were based on what the declarant
believed those plans to be. Obviously, Walters, the declarant, was
not an authority on Hillmon's state of mind; consequently, Walters
could have been mistaken in his belief. That is precisely the problem
Congress had to confront. There were, I think, two basic alternatives
available to Congress: (1) permit the state of mind declaration to
evidence another person's future conduct where the total evidence
indicates that, while there was a possibility that the declarant may
have been mistaken in his belief as to the other's plans, that possibility is very slight, 138 or (2) preclude the use of the state of mind declaration to evidence another person's future conduct in all cases. As
is known, Congress chose the second alternative.13 9 Congress was
most likely aware that
[t]he state of mind exception [is]. . . the most pernicious of the
many hearsay exceptions. The perniciousness arises from the potential capacity of the exception to consume the entire rule. After all,
in one way or another, every declaration to some extent evidences
the declarant's then existing state of mind. Were the exception
made applicable to every extrajudicial declaration, the hearsay rule
itself would virtually disappear.1,40
Apparently, then, Congress deemed it necessary to circumscribe
Hillmon to preserve the integrity of the hearsay rule.
Perhaps the most nearly perfect set of facts available to dramatize the difference between Hillmon and rule 803(3) occurred in
United States v. Pheaster.141 Hugh Pheaster and Angelo Inciso appealed their convictions of conspiring to kidnap 16-year old Larry
Adell. Inciso argued that the trial court had erred in permitting gov137.

Seidelson, The State of Mind Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 13 DuQ. L. REv.

251, 253 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Seidelson, State of Mind].
138.

That would have been my own preference. See id. at 258-61.

139. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
140. Seidelson, State of Mind, supra note 137, at 251-52 (footnote omitted).
141. 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977).
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ernment witnesses to testify that, shortly before his disappearance,
Adell had told the witnesses "that he was going to meet Angelo at
Sambo's North at 9:30 P.M. to 'pick up a pound of marijuana which
Angelo had promised him for free.'

"14

As the Ninth Circuit noted

in Pheaster,Inciso's contention was "premised on the view that the
statements could not properly be used by the jury to conclude that
Larry did in fact meet Inciso in the parking lot of Sambo's North at
approximately 9:30 P.M ..... ",4 Let us attempt our own resolution of that contention. Under Hillmon, the state of mind declarations of Larry Adell might be admissible as evidence of both his future conduct and that of Angelo, since the conduct of both was
related, as was the future conduct of Walters and Hillmon. Under
rule 803(3), however, the state of mind declaration may not be used
"to prove the fact

. . .

believed. 1 4 Clearly, Adell's declarations in-

dicated his belief as to what Angelo was going to do. Just as clearly,
Adell was not an authority on Angelo's state of mind. Adell may
have been mistaken in his belief that Angelo intended to meet him.
Consequently, under the House Judiciary Committee Report, which
provides that "statements of intent by a declarant [are] admissible
only to prove his future conduct, not the future conduct of another
person,'" the declarations of Adell would not be admissible to
prove that Angelo in fact met Adell. Yet the Ninth Circuit affirmed
Inciso's conviction, stating that "we cannot conclude that the district
court erred in allowing the testimony concerning Larry Adell's statements to be introduced."' "
The court carefully reviewed Hillmon, rule 803(3), and the
rule's pre-legislative and legislative history. Indeed, the court found
that
[t]he notes of the House Committee on the Judiciary are significantly different [from the Advisory Committee's note.] The language used [by the House Committee] suggests a legislative intention to cut back on what that body also perceived to be the
prevailing common law view, namely, that the Hillmon doctrine
could be applied to facts such as those now before us.147
142. United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d at 375.
143. Id.
144. FED. R. EvID. 803(3).
145.
CONG. &
146.
147.

H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.
AD. NEWS 7075, 7087.
Pheaster, 544 F.2d at 380.
Id.
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Then why the affirmance? I think the answer lies in the language
used by the court: "Although the new Federal Rules of Evidence
were not in force at the time of the trial below, we refer to them for
any light that they might shed on the status of the common law at
the time of the trial. 1 48 Apparently, the court concluded that rule
803(3), in force at the time of the Ninth Circuit's decision, but not
at the time of trial, was, for that reason, inapplicable.
Congress, however, provided the following language with respect to the applicability of the Federal Rules of Evidence:
[T]he following rules shall take effect on the one hundred and
eightieth day beginning after the date of the enactment of this Act.
These rules apply to actions, cases, and proceedings brought after
the rules take effect. These rules also apply to further procedure
in actions, cases, and proceedings then pending, except to the extent that application of the rules would not be feasible, or would
work injustice, in which event former evidentiary principles
1 49
apply.
The Ninth Circuit did not cite to that language. Apparently, it did
not recognize that rule 803(3) was applicable to the case before it,
absent a judicial determination that such application "would not be
feasible, or would work injustice." That is certainly a surprise.
Perhaps even more surprising, however, is the conclusion asserted by the Second Circuit in United States v. Moore.1 0 The court
stated:
[Appellant] contends that Fed.R.Evid. 803(3) was approved
by Congress with the understanding that it be construed to limit
the Hillmon rule to render statements of intent by a declarant admissible only to prove his future conduct, not that of a third person. . . .As the Government points out, however, the Advisory
Committee Note to Rule 803(3) left the Hillmon doctrine "undisturbed," and the courts have held that Hillmon declarations of intent are admissible as evidence of actions of the declarant and
others. See United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1297-98 n.
1 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Pheaster,544 F.2d 353, 379-80
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Inciso v. United States, 429
U.S. 1099. . .(1977).151
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 379.
Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1926 (emphasis added).
571 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1978).
Id. at 82 n.3 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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That assertion is surprising for several reasons. Given the apparent
inconsistency between the Advisory Committee's note and the House
Judiciary Committee Report, the latter would seem to be the more
significant indicator of legislative intent. That conclusion would seem
to take on an a fortiori significance, given the specificity of the language of the Committee Report: "[T]he Committee intends that the
Rule be construed to limit the doctrine of.

.

.Hillmon,.

.

. so as to

render statements of intent by a declarant admissible only to prove
his future conduct, not the future conduct of another person. '152
Second, the cases cited by the Second Circuit in support of its conclusion in Moore hardly constitute persuasive authority. As was previously discussed, in Pheasterthe Ninth Circuit applied the law as it
existed prior to the effective date of the Rules. Indeed, the Pheaster
opinion indicates that the result might have been different had rule
803(3) been applied. United States v. Stanchich, 53 the other case
cited in Moore, hardly supports Moore's conclusion. In Stanchich,
the Second Circuit opined:
The exception allowing the admission of a declaration of a state of
mind not simply to show the state of mind but a subsequent act of
the declarant is, of course, the rule of.

.

.Hillmon,.

.

. which the

Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) expressly left undisturbed, and which the House of Judiciary Committee Report

. .

.meant to "limit" only by rendering statements

of intent admissible solely to prove the declarant'sfuture conduct,
not the future conduct of another.'"

Finally, and perhaps most surprising, the facts of Moore did not
require a determination of the scope of rule 803(3) and the court
recognized that fact. The defendants, Moore and Burnell, were
charged with "conspiracy to kidnap [Henry "Buster"] Huggins,"
with the "actual kidnapping," with "conspiracy to transmit in interstate commerce a communication containing a demand for ransom
for Huggins' release," and with "actually transmitting in interstate
commerce such a ransom demand."15 5 To prove that the defendants
"'willfully transported [Huggins] in interstate or foreign commerce,' ,,6the government introduced evidence of a declaration al152.

H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.

CODE

CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075-7087.
153. 550 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1977).

154. Id. at 1298 n.1 (emphasis added).
155.

Moore, 571 F.2d at 78 (footnote omitted).

156. Id. at 81 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(1)(1976)).
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legedly made by Burnell to his girlfriend,1 57 to the effect that Moore
"would have somebody take [Huggins] out of the states." '58 The
trial court received the declaration "as the statement of a conspirator, made in furtherance of the conspiracy and, on the authority of
. . . Hillmon . . . , as a statement of intent admitted to show that
the intended act was subsequently performed." ' 5 9
Let us assume, for the sake of analysis, that the declaration was
properly admissible as a coconspirator declaration. That would indicate that: (1) the government had introduced appropriate independent evidence of a conspiracy between Burnell and Moore; (2)
Burnell's declaration was made while the conspiracy was ongoing;
and (3) the declaration was made in furtherance of the conspiracy.160 In those circumstances, would the declaration be admissible
to prove the future conduct of Moore? I think the answer must be
yes. Assuming the existence of a conspiracy between Burnell and
Moore, the latter would be deemed to have impliedly authorized the
former to speak on Moore's behalf, even with regard to the latter's
future conduct.1 "1 Thus, the declaration would have been admissible
to evidence Moore's future conduct under rule 801(d)(2)(E), and
reference to rule 803(3) would have been unnecessary.
Suppose, however, that Burnell's declaration was not a coconspirator's declaration-perhaps, because it was not made in furtherance of the conspiracy-would the declaration then be admissible
under rule 803(3) to evidence the future conduct of Moore? On that
point, the Second Circuit concluded that no decision was required
because, even assuming the admissibility of the declaration, and even
assuming its admissibility to prove the future conduct of Moore, the
declaration was "not sufficient . . . to prove that any actual interstate transportation of Buster Huggins ever occurred. 1 62 Therefore,
the court concluded that "we need not re-examine [the trial court's]
decision to admit [Burnell's declaration] ."163 Ultimately, the court's
language indicating that Burnell's declaration could evidence the future conduct of Moore under rule 803(3) turns out to be pure dictum. It seems unfortunate that the court saw fit to assert its negating
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 79, 81.
Id. at 81.
Id.

160. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
161. See supra text accompanying note 37. In those circumstances, however, I believe
that rule 104(b) should be deemed applicable.
162. Moore, 571 F.2d at 82 (emphasis in original).
163. Id.
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reading of the House Judiciary Committee Report when that read-

ing was unnecessary to the court's decision. The misfortune is enhanced by a realization that today's dictum often becomes to-

morrow's decision. Other circuits, confronted with the problem, have
given effect to the restrictive language appearing in the House Judiciary Committee Report.'" I hope that courts facing the issue in the
future will give appropriate effect to the rather clear congressional

intent reflected in the House Judiciary Committee Report.
VII. RULE 804(B)(2) AND "DYING DECLARATIONS"
Prior to the enactment of the Rules, the traditional judicial
treatment of dying declarations was to admit them only in homicide
prosecutions.1 65 Rule 804(b)(2) dramatically broadened the applicability of the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule by mak-

ing such declarations admissible "[i]n a prosecution for homicide or
in a civil action or proceeding.""6 The sound rationale for that
change is suggested in the Advisory Committee's note to rule
804(b)(2):

164. The Fourth Circuit, commenting on the House Judiciary Committee Report,
stated: "Approving the Rule in its submitted form, the Congress directed ... that it be construed to confine the doctrine in Hillmon so that statements of intent by a declarant would be
admissible only to prove the declarant's future conduct, not the future conduct of others."
United States v. Jenkins, 579 F.2d 840, 843 (4th Cir.) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978). The dissent in Jenkins noted: "[T]he hearsay exception for statements of a declarant's existing state of mind is applicable only to admit proof of
the declarant's future conduct, not that of third persons." Id. at 845 (Widener, J., dissenting).
The First Circuit noted with respect to this issue: "[T]he statements that this [declarant]. . . is claimed to have made concerning his intention of seeing [the] defendant. . . would
not be admissible against [the defendant]. See Rule 803(3), Fed. R. Evid., 28 U.S.C.A., note
to paragraph (3)." Gual Morales v. Hernandez Vega, 579 F.2d 677, 680 n.2 (Ist Cir. 1978).
In another decision, even the Second Circuit viewed this as an open question: "Are the Senate
and the President or, for that matter, the members of the House who were not on the Committee to be considered to have adopted the text of the Rule, as glossed by the Advisory Committee's Note that Rule 803(3) enacted Hillmon, or the House Committee's 'construction' which,
in effect, seriously restricts Hillmon?" United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d 32, 43 n.12 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931 (1978).
165. The first of these [arbitrary limiting rules] is the rule that the use of dying
declarations is limited to criminal prosecutions for homicide. . . . [N]early all
courts . . . now refuse to admit dying declarations in civil cases, whether death
actions or other civil cases, or in criminal cases other than those charging homicide
as an essential part of the offense . ...
The concept of necessity limited to protection of the state against the slayer who
might go free because of the death of his victim, spins out into another consequence.
This is the further limitation that not only must the charge be homicide, but also
the defendant in the present trial must be charged with the death of the declarant.
MCCORMICK's EvIDENCE, supra note 2 § 283, at 682 (2d ed. 1972) (footnotes omitted).
166. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(2) (emphasis added).
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The common law required that the statement be that of the
victim, offered in a prosecution for criminal homicide. .... While
the common law exception no doubt originated as a result of the
exceptional need for the evidence in homicide cases, the theory of
admissibility [-that powerful psychological pressures are present
to assure trustworthiness-] applies equally in civil cases .... "I
Given that dramatic broadening of the scope of the admissibility of
such declarations, I anticipated that rule 804(b)(2) would promptly
and frequently be applied in wrongful death actions brought in federal courts. I envisioned dozens of cases in which plaintiff's counsel
would offer into evidence a decedent's dying declaration tending to
inculpate the defendant, exculpate the decedent or both. In fact, I
anticipated some personal injury actions in which plaintiff's counsel
Would offer the declaration of the surviving, but gravely injured,
plaintiff that tended to inculpate the defendant or exculpate the
plaintiff or both. After all, under rule 804(b)(2), "[u]navailability is
not limited to death."1 8 The prior declaration of a plaintiff "unable
to be present or to testify at the hearing because of . . . then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity"'6 9 would be
70
admissible.1
My expectations were predicated on three factors. First, it is
clear that rule 804(b)(2) was intended to encompass the aforementioned use of "dying declarations." Second, every plaintiff's lawyer
must be sensitive to the enormous impact that "the last words" of a
decedent or a gravely injured plaintiff are likely to have on a jury.
Finally, such use had been attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, in state
7
courts prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.1 1
167. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) advisory committee note. The Advisory Committee explained that, "[w]hile the original religious justification for the exception may have lost its
conviction for some persons over the years, it can scarcely be doubted that powerful psychological pressures are present." Id. (citations omitted).
168.

Id.

169. FED. R. EvID. 804 (a)(4).
170.

See FED. R. EvID. 804.

171. See, e.g., Phillips v. Dow Chem. Co., 151 So. 2d 199 (Miss. 1963) (wrongful death
action; dying declarations are inadmissible in other than homicide cases); Cummings v. Illinois
Cent. R.R., 364 Mo. 868, 880-81, 269 S.W.2d 111, 119-20(1954) (controversy arose as to
whether the decedent's declaration was a true "dying declaration"; although the court "as-

sum[ed] without deciding" that the declaration fit that category, the court ruled it inadmissible in the civil action); see also 31A C.J.S. § 238, at 643 & n.12 (1964) ("It has been generally held that dying declarations are not admissible in civil cases.
...). For a further
discussion of Cummings, see infra text accompanying notes 172-82.
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In Cummings v. Illinois Central Railroad,17 2 the decedent sustained a fatal work-connected injury. 73 A wrongful death action was
brought against the employer-railroad under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act.1 74 Under that act, there exists concurrent jurisdiction
between federal and state courts. 15 The plaintiff's counsel elected to
sue in state court. The decedent in Cummings had died from burns
he received while starting a fire at work. 176 The plaintiff alleged that
the defendant had negligently permitted gasoline to be stored in a
can intended for kerosene.177 The defendant asserted that the gasoline which had caused the fire had not come from a container maintained by the defendant. 78 A witness called by the plaintiff testified
to a purported dying declaration made by the decedent which indicated that the gasoline had come from a kerosene can maintained by
the defendant. 79 Judgment for the plaintiff was reversed by the appellate court, 80 which concluded that the dying declaration exception was not available in civil cases.' If the same case arose today,
and if plaintiff's counsel opted for a federal court, the decedent's
declaration, assuming it was a dying declaration, would be
admissible.
Moreover, there is reason to believe that the federal courts
would be delighted to embrace the enlarged application of
804(b)(2). Even before the Rules were enacted, some of the courts
evidenced their discomfort with the conclusion that a dying declaration, admissible in a homicide prosecution where the defendant's liberty or even his life was at stake, was inadmissible in civil litigation. 8 2 Indeed, in United Services Automobile Association v.
Wharton,'8 3 the trial court admitted into evidence the dying declaration of an automobile passenger indicating that the driver, the deM
clarant's husband, had intentionally caused the fatal collision.'
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
1965).
183.
184.

364 Mo. 868, 269 S.W.2d 111 (1954).
Id. at 871, 269 S.W.2d at 114.
See generally 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976).
Id. at § 56 (1972).
Cummings, 364 Mo. at 871-72, 269 S.W.2d at 114.
See id. at 872, 269 S.W.2d at 114.
See id. at 873-74, 882-83, 269 S.W.2d at 115-16, 121-22.
See Id. at 873, 269 S.W.2d at 115.
Id. at 883, 269 S.W.2d at 122.
See id. at 881-82, 269 S.W.2d at 120-21.
See, e.g., United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Wharton, 237 F. Supp. 255, 258 (W.D.N.C.
237 F. Supp. 255 (W.D.N.C. 1965).
Id. at 258, 260.
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Based on that declaration, the court concluded that the driver's liability insurance policy was inapplicable to the event. 185 Four years
later, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a decedent's dying declaration, indicating the cause of a fatal fire, "was probably admissible
under. . .Wharton."1 86
What surprises me is that I have found no post-Rules civil cases
in which "a statement made by a declarant while believing that his
death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what
he believed to be his impending death,"'8 7 was offered in evidence.1 88
No wrongful death actions exist, nor personal injury actions. Why?
One possible explanation, of course, is that no civil actions involving
such a declaration have gone to trial in a federal court since the
effective date of the Rules. I confess, however, that it is, difficult for
me to accept that explanation. There must be a significant number
of wrongful death actions tried in federal courts every year, some
there as federal causes of action, and others as diversity cases. In
some of those cases, the decedent, speaking in extremis, is likely to
have uttered something concerning the cause of his death which either inculpates the eventual defendant or exculpates himself. I recognize that the number of personal injury actions in federal courts,
either as federal causes of action or diversity cases, in which the
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 260.
Tug Raven v. Trexler, 419 F.2d 536, 547 (4th Cir. 1969).
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
Apparently, my inability to find a post-Rules federal civil action in which a "dying

declaration" was offered in evidence is not unique. In J. WEINSTEIN, J. MANSFIELD, N.
ABRAMS & M. BERGER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 842 n.5 (7th ed 1983), the

authors note that rule 804(b)(2) makes dying declarations admissible in civil actions but cite
no cases. In E. GREEN & C. NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 34345 (1983), the authors quote rule 804(b)(2) and pose a wrongful death action hypothetical,
but cite no such actual case. In Epstein, Joseph & Saltzburg, supra note 22, at 295, the
discussion of rule 804 contains no cases under 804(b)(2). In M. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE: TEXT,
RULES, ILLUSTRATIONS AND PROBLEMS 264 (1983), the author notes the applicability of rule
804(b)(2) to civil actions but cites no case. In R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN
APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 482-85 (2d ed. 1982), the authors discuss the extension of the dying

declaration exception to civil cases, cite rule 804(b)(2), but cite no federal civil action. In E.
CLEARY & J. STRONG, EVIDENCE, CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 662-63 (3d ed. 1981), the
authors cite rule 804(b)(2), refer to its applicability in civil actions, but cite no federal civil
case.

In C.

MCCORMICK, F. ELLIOTT & J. SUTTON, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE

814 n.2 (5th ed. 1981), the authors refer to dying declarations in civil cases, cite United Servs.
Auto. Ass'n v. Wharton, 237 F. Supp. 255 (W.D.N.C. 1965), see supra text accompanying
notes 183-85, but cite no post-Rules federal civil action. In G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 258-59 (1978), the author quotes rule 804(b)(2), notes that it applies
"to any civil case," but cites no federal civil action. Still, I expect and hope that some of those
who read this article will be aware of such cases and will be kind enough to bring them to my
attention.
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plaintiff is physically or mentally unable to testify at trial and, while
still able to speak, uttered a declaration inculpating the defendant or
exculpating himself, is likely to be substantially lower than the number of such wrongful death actions. Combining both types of actions,
however, it becomes difficult to accept the conclusion that no opportunity to utilize rule 804(b)(2) in a civil case has arisen since the
effective date of the Rules. Then what explanation can there be for
the omission?
It is possible, I suppose, that lawyers, long accustomed to having
"dying declarations" received in evidence only in homicide prosecutions, have not recognized the availability of that hearsay exception
in civil actions in federal courts. I should emphasize that the possibility is simply a product of my own speculative efforts to explain the
absence of civil actions in federal courts in which "dying declarations" have been offered in evidence. That possibility may be enhanced slightly with regard to those lawyers practicing in the many
states which retain the traditional limited role for such declarations.
There may be some inclination toward assuming that, if the declaration is inadmissible in a state court, it is likely to be inadmissible in a
federal court. The truth, of course, is that the broadened availability
of the declaration in rule 804(b)(2) may (and perhaps should) be a
critical factor in plaintiff's counsel's opting for a federal court in
every instance where a choice exists, not only in federal actions, but
in diversity cases as well. The admissibility of such a declaration
could make the difference between a directed verdict for the defendant and a legally sufficient case for the plaintiff. At the very least,
it could make an already sufficient case enormously more persuasive
to the fact finder, judge or jury. The time has come for plaintiffs'
lawyers to start utilizing rule 804(b)(2).
There is a second surprise lurking in rule 804(b)(2), one generated by a Supreme Court opinion having nothing to do with a dying
declaration. For years, state and federal courts have assumed that
the receipt in evidence of a dying declaration which inculpates the
defendant in a homicide prosecution does not violate the defendant's
sixth amendment right of confrontation, 8 9 even though the accused
has no opportunity to confront and cross-examine the declarant.190
189. U.S.CoNsT. amend VI. The accused's sixth amendment right to confrontation imports the constitutional privilege to cross-examine witnesses. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,
315-17 (1974).
190. One commentator notes: "The confrontation clause never has been read so literally
as to preclude generally the use of hearsay evidence in criminal trials. . . .Even admission
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That assumption has rested primarily on the ancient opinion of the
Supreme Court in Mattox v. United States.191 In Mattox, however,
the Court held that the homicide victim's dying declaration, exculpating the accused, was admissible.1 92 Obviously, where the accused
offers the exculpating dying declaration in evidence, his sixth amendment confrontation right is not implicated. Still, the Court in Mattox did say: "Dying declarations are admissible on a trial for murder
as to the fact of the homicide and the person by whom it was committed, in favor of the defendant as well as against him."1 3 That
italicized dictum became the foundation for the apparently unanimous view that the receipt in evidence of such a declaration does not
do violence to. the defendant's confrontation right.
Today, as the result of a much more recent Supreme Court
opinion, a firmer foundation exists. In Ohio v. Roberts,1 94 the Court
held that, where the declarant is unavailable 95 through no fault or
neglect attributable to the prosecution, 9 6 and the declaration constitutes "a firmly rooted hearsay exception"197 or possesses "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,"1 98 the declaration may be received in evidence against the accused without violating his
confrontation right.1 99 Obviously, the unavailability of a homicide
victim is not likely to be attributable to prosecutorial fault or neglect. Just as obviously, a dying declaration is a firmly rooted hearsay
exception. Apparently then, Roberts, while dealing with preliminary
hearing testimony rather than a dying declaration, 200 converts the
dictum of Mattox into something much closer to a decision that the
accused's confrontation right does not bar the receipt in evidence of
an inculpating dying declaration.
against the accused of dying declarations apparently is permissible
G. LILLY, supra note 188, at 274 (1978) (footnote omitted).
191.

.

146 U.S. 140 (1892).

192. Id. at 152-53.
193.

Id. at 151 (emphasis added).

194. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). For a critical appraisal of Ohio v. Roberts, see Seidelson, The
Confrontation Clause, the Right Against Self-Incriminationand the Supreme Court: A Critique and Some Modest Proposals, 20 DUQ. L. REv. 429 (1982).
195. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a) ("definition of unavailability").

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 75-77.
See id. at 66.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 58-59.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1984

41

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

VIII.

[Vol. 12:453

CONCLUSION

Of the surprises noted in this article, some seem to be the product of a less than ideal working relationship between Congress and
the courts with regard to the Federal Rules of Evidence. I believe
that the courts have "used" rule 104(a) to subvert the apparent applicability of rule 104(b) to coconspirator declarations in order to
eliminate a judicial annoyance with jury "second-guessing" of judicial rulings on admissibility. As I discussed earlier, I do not believe
that the annoyance is well-based. Rather, I believe that the problem
rests on a judicial overuse of conditional relevancy prior to the effective date of the Rules and a judicial overreaction after the effective
date. That overreaction could be remedied by a Supreme Court decision holding rule 104(b) applicable to those coconspirator declarations which are only conditionally relevant.
With regard to rule 301 and presumptions in federal actions,
both Congress and the courts can be faulted. Clearly, Congress could
have enacted a rule expressly creating a rebuttable presumption and
thus eliminated any ambiguity arising out of either the less than explicit language of the rule or the potential inconsistency between the
language of the rule and that of the Conference Committee Report.
It is equally clear that the Court in Burdine, with a more explicit
reliance on rule 301, could have eliminated the ambiguity without
changing either the result achieved or any other portion of the opinion. That the Court did not rely more explicitly on rule 301 implies
that the Court may have overlooked the direct applicability of the
rule and Congress's rather clear intention that, "[iln all civil actions
.. .not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress, or by these
rules, ' 20 1 the rule is to apply. That the Court overlooked the direct
applicability of rule 301 makes it a little less surprising that a circuit
court may have overlooked the rule entirely in a res ipsa case. Traditionally, federal courts fashioned judicial rules governing presumptions and, admittedly, old habits are hard to change. But when Congress, having the legislative authority to fashion rules of evidence for
federal courts, exercises that authority, the federal courts are bound
to comply with the will of Congress. I believe Congress has adequately (if not perfectly) expressed its will in rule 301; the obligation
is on the courts to comply.
The apparent reluctance of the Second Circuit in Moore to extend significance to the explicit language of the House Judiciary
201.

FED.

R. EVID. 301.
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Committee limiting Hillmon, and the same circuit's characterization
of the issue as an open one in Mangan, imply to me a reluctance to
abandon the traditional judicial treatment of state of mind declarations, even in the face of the express limiting language found in the
legislative history of Rule 803(3). As with rule 301, I believe that
the courts have an obligation to comply with the congressional decision, even if that decision alters the traditional judicial treatment. In
enacting the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress had no obligation
to perpetuate judicial rules of evidence; had that been the case, the
Rules would have been superfluous. Rather, the obligation is on the
courts to effectuate the will of Congress. Fortunately, the First Circuit in Morales and the Fourth Circuit in Jenkins recognized that
obligation. Eiulation of their reaction by the other circuits would
now seem appropriate.
In the Eighth Circuit's opinions declining to apply rule 407 to
strict liability cases, I see no judicial reluctance to comply with the
will of Congress; rather, it seems to me, the Eighth Circuit arrived
at a conclusion not clearly inconsistent with the Rule and having an
articulated rationale. And, if I read De Luryea correctly, that circuit
may be in the process of distinguishing away its own rationale. Similarly, in the nonuse of dying declarations in civil actions under rule
804(b)(2), there is no evidence of a judicial reluctance to comply
with the will of Congress. Rather, the problem seems to be one of
counsel not having afforded the courts opportunities to receive dying
declarations in civil actions. And in Samuelson and the opinions accepting that case's application of Klaxon to privilege issues arising in
diversity cases, the courts appear to have displayed a high level of
sensitivity to the decision made by Congress in rule 501.
Overall, I believe the Federal Rules of Evidence have had a
beneficial effect in court and in the classroom. I think that effect can
be enhanced if the federal courts strive to achieve a conscious awareness that, to the extent that the Rules may have changed traditional
evidentiary rulings with regard to presumptions and the scope of
Hillmon, those traditional rulings were intended to be supplanted. I
think that the beneficial effect would be enhanced, too, if the Supreme Court were to demonstrate by decision that rule 104 was not
intended by Congress to make every coconspirator declaration independently relevant. Add to that recipe a growing awareness by counsel of the admissibility of dying declarations in civil actions, and the
next decade under the Rules should be even better than the first near
decade.
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